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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Due Process-Confession of Judgment Procedures Are
Not Unconstitutional Per Se
I.

INTRODUCTION

Confession of judgment procedures' have seldom received unre-

stricted legislative approval by the stafes2z-the vast majority of jurisdictions have enacted legislation either to eliminate the practice entirely or

to limit severely its use.3 Unrestricted employment of the procedure in
consumer transactions is prevalent only in the states of Pennsylvania,
I. A warrant of attorney is "an instrument in writing, addressed to one or more attorneys
therein named, authorizing them, generally, to appear in any court, or in some specified court, on
behalf of the person giving it, and to confess judgment in favor of some particular person therein
named, in an action of debt." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1757 (4th ed. 1951). Throughout this
Comment, the terms "warrant of attorney" and "confession of judgment" are used interchangeably.
2. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (1961).
3. Eleven states declare such judgments void and unenforceable. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16

(1958);

ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-143 (1956); FLA. STAT. § 55.05 (1969); GA. CODE
110-601 (1959); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.140 (Supp. 1971); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 231, § 13A (1956); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1545 (1942); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 13-811
(1947); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:16-9 (1951); TENN. CODE ANN. § 25-201 (1955); TEX. REV. Civ.
ANN. §

art. 2224 (1971). Two other states go even further and make the execution of such a clause
a criminal misdemeanor. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2906 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-9-16, 21-918 (1953). Twenty-three states have either effectively abolished the use of confession of judgment
or have eliminated its attractiveness by placing various procedural limitations on the practice.
STAT.

ALASKA STAT.

§ 09.30.050 (1962) and

ALASKA

R. Civ. P. 57(c) (1962);

ARK. STAT. ANN.

§ 29-

301 to -303 (1948); CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. §§ 1132-35 (West 1955) as amended (West Supp. 196869); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 52-193 to -195 (1958); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 10-901 to -903
(1947); IOWA CODE §§ 676.1-.4 (1950); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 61-105 (19.64); LA. CONST. art.
7, § 44; MD. ANN. CODE, RULE OF PROCEDURE 645 (1947); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§548.22-.23
(1947); Mo. REV. STAT. § 511.070-.100 (1952); 2 NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 17.090-.111 (1967); NEW
YORK CIv. PRAC. § 3218 (McKinney 1963); N.D.R. Civ. P. 68(c); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 689-95 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 26.010-.130 (1961); S.C. CODE ANN. §4 10-1535 to
-1538 (1962); S.D. COMPILED LAW ANN. §§ 26-1 to -5 (1967); UTAH R. Civ. P. 58A(e) (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

12, § 4671 (1958);

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§§ 6.60.010-.070 (1962);

W. VA.

§ 50-13-5 (1966). Four states, although having no general legislation on point, do
prohibit confessed judgment clauses in particular situations. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6
(1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3084 (1964); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:7(VIII)
(1955); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 19-25-24 (1968). The remaining states generally permit the procedure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2306 (1953); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-3 (1968); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (Smith-Hurd 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2906 (1962); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2323.13 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. §4 8355 (Supp. 1971) to -356 (1950); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 270.69 (1958); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-309 to
-313 (1957).
CODE ANN.
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account for a preponderance of the confessed

judgments in the United States today.5 Although the constitutional
validity of cognovit notes has been questioned on numerous occasions,,
the Supreme Court had never addressed this issue until its recent decisions upholding the use of these devices in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick
Co. 7 and Swarb v. Lennox.8 An examination of these decisions, together

with judicial treatment of other areas presenting similar constitutional
considerations, indicates a fundamental inconsistency in delineation of
the scope of an individual's due process right to be protected in his
person and property.
II.

DUE PROCESS AND THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY

As early as 1876, the Supreme Court recognized that "wherever

one is assailed in his person or his property, there he may defend." 9 In
Hovey v. Elliott, the Court held that "due process of law signifies a right
to be heard in one's defense."' 0 The resulting doctrine-that the opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of a property right is a
fundamental requisite of due process-has continuously been upheld by

the Court." Further judicial refinements of this doctrine prescribe not
only that the property owner must be afforded a hearing, but also that
this hearing must be held at a meaningful time and conducted in a
manner meaningful and appropriate to the nature of the particular
case. 2 The Court has recognized, however; that under certain extraordi4. 16 VILL. L. REV. 571, 573 (1971).
5. See Hopson, supra note 2, at 115; Note, Confessions of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
524, 525 (1954).
6. See, e.g., Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971) (Delaware statutory
scheme for confession ofjudgments held unconstitutional); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25 N.Y.2d
219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S. 382 (1969) (constitutionality of Pennsylvania confession of
judgment procedure questioned in a proceeding to determine whether a Pennsylvania confessed
judgment should be given full faith and credit in New York).
7. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
8. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
9. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277 (1876) (barring owner of real property from
appearing in confiscation proceeding was unconstitutional).
10. 167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897) (defendant may not be denied hearing as punishment for
contempt).
11. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process prohibits a state from
denying indigents access to its courts to dissolve their marriages solely because of inability to pay
court fees); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (due process requires a hearing prior to
termination of welfare benefits); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (due process
prohibits prejudgment garnishment of wages); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914) (due process
requires appropriate service of process).
12. E.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) (failure to give petitioner notice of
pending adoption proceeding was violative of due process); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
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nary circumstances a hearing may be postponed until after the seizure

13
of an individual's property in order to protect a valid governmental

or creditor 4 interest. In other words, due process assures to each indi-

vidual the right, within reasonable limits, to a meaningful opportunity
to be heard before he may be deprived of a significant property interest. 5 This does not mean, however, that an individual cannot waive his

due process right to notice and an appropriate hearing, 6 but rather that
there exists a strong presumption against any waiver of these constitutional rights. 7 The Supreme Court has stated that in order for a waiver
to be effective it must be an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. 8 Moreover, the courts may not presume
acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights, but must examine the
relevant circumstances to determine whether the waiver was made voluntarily, intelligently, and with a sufficient awareness of the legal conse-

quences." More recently, the Court has become increasingly sensitive
to the hardship imposed upon individuals in lower- and middle-income
groups who are deprived of property without a prior, meaningful hear-

ing. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,21 the Court held that, when

no special need for immediacy exists, garnishment of wages by a credi-

tor prior to a hearing violates the fourteenth amendment prohibition
against the taking of property without due process of law. 21 Justice
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice must be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to be
heard).
13. See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (summary
exclusion from government property without a hearing upheld when activities were of a highly
classified nature); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of articles
dangerous to the public health without a prior hearing sustained).
14. See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) (Federal Home Loan Bank's appointment of a conservator to take charge of the affairs of a loan association without holding a hearing
did not violate due process).
15. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
16. In National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukshent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964), the Supreme
Court said that the "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether."
17. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (right to counsel in a criminal
case); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937) (right to jury trial); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937) (order by commission requiring telephone company to
refund excess earnings).
18. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
19. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
20. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
21. Never before had the Court held that due process requires a prior hearing even when
the restrictions on the use of the property are relatively brief and an eventual hearing is guaranteed.
See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 60, 113 (1969).
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Douglas, speaking for the Court, was careful not to assert the absolutist
proposition that any interference with an individual's property prior to
judgment is necessarily violative of the due process clause; he reasoned,
rather, that when no paramount state or creditor interest is present and
when the debtor is readily subject to the in personam jurisdiction of the
state courts, the due process clause mandates that he be afforded an
opportunity for a hearing before his wages may be taken. 22 Further
support for the proposition that this kind of prejudgment garnishment
cannot be constitutionally tolerated was drawn from the categorization
of wages as "a specialized type of property presenting distinct problems
in our economic system,"2 and the recognition of the substantive evils
inherent in any type of wage garnishment procedure. 24 A similar concern
regarding the hardships that may be inflicted upon the poor when they
are deprived of significant property interests without notice and an
opportunity to be heard was evidenced in Goldberg v. Kelly, 25 which
held that due process requires that recipients of welfare benefits be
afforded evidentiary hearings before these benefits may be terminated,
regardless of the availability of procedures for full hearings following
benefit termination.26 The Court engaged in a balancing process and
concluded that the individual's interest in retaining his welfare benefits
until an impartial hearing on the issue can be held outweighs the govern27
ment's interest in summary action.
Prior to the Overmyer and Swarb decisions, the Supreme Court
had decided only two cases that concerned confession of judgment provisions in cognovit notes. In both, rather than examining the constitutionality of the procedure under the due process clause, the Court rested
its decision upon the full faith and credit clause.21 At least one state
court, however, has inquired whether confession of judgment procedures
violate the due process clause. In Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 9 the
22. 395 U.S. at 339.
23. Id. at 340.
24. A number of prejudgment garnishment claims are fraudulent. Moreover, the procedure
gives a creditor considerable leverage over a wage-earner and, as a practical.matter, may deprive
a wage-earning family of access to the necessities of life. See 68 MICH. L. REv. 986 (1970).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
26. Id. at 261.

27. Id. at 266.
28. National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257 (1904) (the Ohio court was without
jurisdiction to enter judgment in favor of the bank since the bank was not the holder of the note;
therefore the Ohio judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit); Grover & Baker Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890) (since the warrant of attorney authorized only an
attorney to confess judgment, the Pennsylvania judgment entered by a prothonotary was invalid
and not entitled to full faith and credit).
29. 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).
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Court of Appeals of New York held that enforcement of a judgment
entered pursuant to an unlimited warrant of attorney that permitted
entry of judgment by confession anywhere in the world is violative of
due process.3 The majority opinion intimated that the warrant of attorney would have posed no constitutional problem had it authorized confession in only one state,3 1 but that the provision allowing entry of
judgment anywhere in the world was too broad to satisfy due process
requirements.3 2 In a recent federal district court decision that examined
the constitutionality of the Delaware confession ofjudgment statute, the
court was not concerned with the situs of the confessed judgment, but
rather directed its inquiry toward whether the statutorily prescribed
method infringed upon plaintiff's right to notice and hearing before
judgment could be entered against him. The court concluded that this
statutory scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to require notice
and hearing before the entry of judgment and provided no method for
judicially determining whether a particular debtor knowingly and intelligently signed the judgment note and waived his fourteenth amendment
rights. 31 Moreover, the opinion stated that the mere signature of a
debtor on a judgment note does not overcome the strong presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights and that in the case before the
court, the creditors had failed to sustain their burden of proving that
the debtors understood the legal consequences of signing the notes con4
taining the waiver provisions.3
III.

D.H.

OVERMYER CO.

v.

35

FRICK CO.

In Overmyer, petitioner, a warehousing corporation, sought to obtain an order vacating a judgment confessed against it in an Ohio
court " pursuant to a confession of judgment provision contained in a
note payable to respondent corporation. Petitioner had inserted the
confession of judgment clause in the note in consideration for respondent's granting it additional time in which to pay a debt owed under a
construction contract. The Supreme Court held that petitioner, in its
30. The court also held that cognovit judgments are not judicial proceedings within the
meaning of the full faith and credit clause; therefore, a New York court need not enforce a cognovit
judgment obtained in Pennsylvania, since the enforcement of that judgment would conflict with
New York public policy.
31. See 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 367 (1970).
32. See 56 VA. L. REV. 554 (1970).

33.

Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971).

34. Id. at 1359.
35. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
36. The Ohio confession of judgment procedure is set forth in Onto REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.13 (Supp. 1971).
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execution and delivery of the note, voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived the rights it would have otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice and hearing. Although it recognized that courts are not to
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights, the Court stated

that the due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment may be waived. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, emphasized that petitioner was a corporation, as opposed to an individual, and

the case involved neither a disparity of bargaining power nor an adhesion contract. The Court further noted that petitioner had never contended that it was unaware of either the existence or the legal signifi-

cance of the cognovit provision, and that it specifically had included this
provision in the note in return for substantial consideration. Furthermore, the Court found that Overmyer was not rendered defenseless by

executing the judgment note, since in Ohio the judgment court may
vacate its judgment upon a showing of a valid defense. In its summation,
the majority opinion emphasized that cognovit clauses do not violate the
due process clause per se, that under certain circumstances these provisions may serve a useful and proper purpose in the commercial world,
and that the instant holding should not be viewed as controlling precedent for other cases arising in different factual settings.37
IV.

SWARB v. LENNOX

38

In Swarb, appellants, on behalf of a class consisting of all Pennsyl-

vania residents who had signed consumer financing agreements or lease
contracts containing cognovit provisions authorizing confessed judgments in Philadelphia County, sought to have the Pennsylvania rules

and statutes providing for confession of judgment 39 declared unconstitutional.' The district court declared the Pennsylvania procedure un37. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, noted ihat, although trial judges traditionally have enjoyed wide discretion in vacating confessed judgments, the Ohio Supreme Court has
placed certain restrictions on the exercise of a judge's discretion in opening confessed judgments.
405 U.S. at 189 (Douglas, J., concurring). In Livingstone v. Rebman, 169 Ohio St. 109, 158
N.E.2d 366 (1959), the Ohio Supreme Court established the principle that a7 confessed judgment
should be opened if the debtor is able to present evidence sufficient to constitute a jury question.
38. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
39. The Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure is set forth in PA. STAT. tit.
12, § 739 (Supp. 1971).
40. Appellants alleged that the Pennsylvania procedure deprived class members of procedural due process in the denial of notice and hearing before the entry of judgment, since the signing
of the cognovit contract was not an intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights. Appellants
also alleged that this procedure violated the equal protection clause, since the only recourse against
the recorded judgment-an action to strike or to open the judgment-is costly and burdensome to
low-income consumers.
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constitutional only as it applied to those Pennsylvania residents signing
cognovit provisions in consumer sales or financing transactions who
earn less than 10,000 dollars annually." From this judgment, the con-

sumers appealed4 2 contending that the district court erred in limiting its
holding of unconstitutionality to the Pennsylvania procedure as applied
to individuals earning less than 10,000 dollars a year. The Supreme

Court rejected the consumers' contention and held that in light of
Overmyer, the Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure is not

unconstitutional per se, since it is possible that, under appropriate circumstances, a cognovit debtor might be held effectively and legally to

have waived his due process rights to prejudgment notice and hearing.
Despite the Overmyer Court's warning that its decision should not be
used as controlling precedent in situations involving adhesion contracts,
bargaining power disparity, or absence of valid consideration for the
cognovit provisions, the Court in Swarb concluded that the one-sided
appeal before it did not present an appropriate occasion for delineating
the impact and effect of Overmyer upon the Pennsylvania confession of

judgment procedure. Finally, the majority was careful to point out that
its affirmance of the district court's decision on the issue of whether the
Pennsylvania system was unconstitutional on its face43 should not be
taken to imply approval of other aspects of the lower court's opinion
that were not raised on appeal.4
V.

CONCLUSION

The Overmyer and Swarb decisions appear to indicate the Supreme
Court's attitude that, although confession of judgment provisions are
not constitutionally improper per se, execution of confessed judgments
41. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In essence, the district court determined that the
Pennsylvania system does comply with due process if there has been an understanding and voluntary waiver of due process rights by the debtor, but the court said that it would be presumed that
there was no such intentional waiver of known rights by consumers earning less than $10,000
annually.
42. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the intervening finance companies did not
cross-appeal. The Pennsylvania Attorney General's office, instead of pursuing its traditional role
of defending the Commonwealth's legislation, joined the appellants in urging that the Pennsylvania
confession of judgment system is constitutionally invalid on its face.
43. Mr. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, argued that the Court has no jurisdiction to
examine that portion of the district court's judgment from which no appeal or cross-appeal was
taken. He did believe, however, that the appellees were free to support that part of the judgment
which was in their favor with arguments that were presented in the court below and rejected by
the district court in arriving at an adverse judgment on other aspects of the case.
44. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, believed that the Court should have undertaken
a specific delineation of the standards required in applying the Overmyer rationale to the Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure.
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without appropriate procedural safeguards is constitutionally suspect.

These decisions indicate further that courts should proceed on a caseby-case basis after judgment has been confessed to determine whether
the debtor adequately understood that he had relinquished his constitutional rights. The practical effect of this development is to relegate the
issue of whether there was a voluntary and intelligent waiver of due
process rights in a given case to the mere status of a claim by the debtor
in his petition to open the judgment." Thus, the evils and harshness of
the procedure, particularly as applied to low-income consumers, remain. The debtor must bear the expense of attorneys' fees and court

costs, the hardship resulting from loss of his property, and the burden
of proving that he did not voluntarily and intelligently waive his right
to notice and hearing.46 Furthermore, the injustices inherent in a procedure that provides for the entry of judgment without prior notice or
hearing are not cured simply because it is possible theoretically for the
consumer to file a petition to open or to strike the judgment.47 It is more

difficult for a debtor who has had a judgment confessed against him to
obtain relief through either of these procedures than if he were afforded

a hearing prior to the entry of judgment. 8 A motion to strike the judgment will be sustained only if defects appear on the face of the record.49
A petition to open the judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of
the court,-" and the proceeding is essentially equitable in nature,51 with

relief as a matter of grace and not of right. Moreover, in spite of the
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights and the established policy that the creditor must sustain the burden of proving that
a debtor made a voluntary waiver, the debtor, in petitioning the court
to open a judgment, has the burden of convincing the court of the
appropriateness of such action, 2 and reversal of the trial court's decision
on the petition will be granted only in instances involving a clear abuse
45. See 75 DICK. L. REV. 169, 180 (1970).
46. Id.
47. See 49 TEXAS L. REV. 169 (1970). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
48. See note 4 supra.
49. See, e.g., Lipshutz v. Plawa, 393 Pa. 268, 141 A.2d 226 (1958); Century Credit Co. v.
Jones, 196 Pa. Super. 210, 173 A.2d 768 (1961).
50. Patton v. Pyle, 52 Del. 210, 155 A.2d 55 (1959).
51. Roche v. Rankin, 406 Pa. 92, 176 A.2d 668 (1962).
52. Ahrens v. Goldstein, 376 Pa. 114, 102 A.2d 164 (1954). In Pennsylvania, the debtor must
carry the burden of convincing the court of the merit of his position to open the judgment solely
through the use of depositions. PA. R. Civ. P. 209. In Ohio, the courts have lessened to some extent
the debtor's burden of proof. In Livingstone v. Rebman, 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959),
the court held that the confessed judgment may be opened if the debtor poses a jury question.
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of discretion.53 In view of these limiting factors, the debtor's opportunity to be heard in his own defense can hardly be considered sufficient to
satisfy the constitutional mandate that an individual not be deprived of
his property without due process of law. Since neither the Ohio nor the
Pennsylvania confession of judgment procedure provides a method for
judicially determining whether a particular debtor knowingly and intelligently waived his fourteenth amendment rights, it would have been
appropriate for the Supreme Court to declare these procedures violative
of the due process clause."
This conclusion of constitutional invalidity under the due process
clause also may be reached by an application of the Sniadach rationale
to the cognovit note issue. Although the language used by the Court in
Sniadach clearly indicates that the import of that decision was restricted
to prejudgment garnishment of wages, logic compels the interpretation
that Sniadach requires a meaningful hearing before an individual may
be deprived of any significant property interest by having a judgment
confessed against him. There is no apparent justification for refusing to
extend Sniadach's garnishment rationale to the taking of other kinds of
property.5 The procedural schemes involved in confessing judgments
are sufficiently similar to prejudgment garnishment procedures to warrant application of the same considerations," and the hardships imposed
upon a debtor in a confession of judgment situation are no less onerous
than those inflicted upon an individual whose wages are garnished prior
to the entry of a judgment against him. Therefore, the underlying reasons for declaring prejudgment garnishment statutes unconstitutional
should apply with full force to confession of judgment procedures. Thus,
under the Sniadach principle, a balancing of the individual's interest
in not being deprived of his property without an appropriate hearing
against the government's interest in judicial economy and the dubious
interest of creditors in retaining self-executing foreclosure devices necessarily results in a conclusion that the individual's interest should prevail
and, therefore, that confession of judgment provisions should be declared unconstitutional per se as violative of the due process clause.57
Another plausible theory for striking down confession of judgment
53. Wilson Laundry Co. v. Joos, 200 Pa. Super. 595, 189 A.2d 917 (1963).
54. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971).
55. See note 4 supra.
56. Id.
57. See note 24 supra. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court engaged in a
similar balancing process and found that the individual's interest in not having welfare benefits

terminated without a prior hearing outweighed the state's interest in summary action and in
reducing administrative expenses.
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procedures is that these procedures violate the equal protection clause,
since their operative effect is to discriminate against the poor. 8 The

proposition that a statute, though neutral on its face, cannot be applied
constitutionally when its application will have a discriminatory effect

upon poor persons as a class can be inferred from the Sniadach decision's recognition of the effect of wage garnishment on the poor as a
basis for invalidating the statute. Clearly, the harmful impact of confes-

sion of judgment procedures on the poor is, at least, as great as that of
wage garnishments.
In view of the constitutional arguments presented above, the

Supreme Court's failure to find that confession procedures are unconstitutional per se is less than satisfactory. Additionally, the Court's disposition of the Overmyer and Swarb cases leaves the precise constitutional

standards to be applied in confession of judgment cases very much in
doubt. The Swarb case presented an opportunity for the Court to delineate the constitutional limitations on confession of judgment procedures

intimated in Overmyer. The Court's failure to take advantage of this
opportunity has left the lower courts with no manageable standards by
which to judge the constitutionality of a confession of judgment procedure as it applies to a particular debtor. The only guidance given by the

Court is this broad statement in Swarb: "[t]he [Overmyer] decision is
'not controlling precedent for other facts of other cases,' and we refer
to contracts of adhesion, to bargaining power disparity, and to the
absence of anything received in return for a cognovit provision. ' 59 This
statement indicates that the Court is aware of the possibilities for imposition of grave injustices upon the poor through the use of cognovit
provisions. Nevertheless, the Overmyer and Swarb decisions do not
indicate clearly the extent to which the Court would act to invalidate
confessions of judgment resulting from situations involving bargaining
power disparities or adhesion contracts.
58. See Note, Some Implications ofSniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 942 (1970). This rationale
has been invoked by the Court to invalidate otherwise nondiscriminatory state statutes that operated to preclude indigent criminal defendants from securing judicial review of their convictions.
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Similarly, it has prevailed to invalidate statutes requiring
the payment of a fee as a condition precedent to the right to vote. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Court, however, never has declared that the equal protection
clause guarantees the poor equal access to the courts in civil matters. In 1968 and 1969, 2 federal
district courts refused to sanction the application of the equal protection clause to civil litigation.
Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Conn. 1969); Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp.
968 (D. Conn. 1968); Moya v. Debaca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968). There is only one reported
decision that has done so. Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 296 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
59. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 201 (1972).

